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Abstract 
Worldwide, particularly in the developing countries, pushed by grinding poverty, artisanal (and small-scale) 
mining is alarmingly being practiced. This type of mining is either a strong predictor of large-scale mining or is 
another side of the same coin. In either or both cases, poverty, conflict and ecological marginalization are common 
denominators almost over all mineral “resource blessed” countries which sooner or later turns into “resource 
curse”. Hence the findings indicate that the sector is primitive, excluded in periphery, inefficient, conflict and 
insecurity-ridden, occupied by ever broadening hostile actors. It is mediated by necessity, seldom materializing 
opportunity, steep market demand, and legal and institutional loopholes. Worst still, the interventions and 
responses by the state miss the points of concern and are misguided. In a nutshell, neither the lootable mining 
sector nor the occupants verge transformability primarily due to respective characteristics. 
Keywords: Lootable, ASM, not-legalized, Nomadic, transformation.  
 
1. Theoretical Context of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Economies 
ASM is poverty-driven as well as perpetuating- mostly the development of ASM is directly related to the 
economic indicators of a country- strongly poverty related. The causing factor for the existence of ASM in 
Africa is simply “abject poverty and dwindling livelihood choices with over 40% of Africans living below the 
poverty line and Vulnerable to a great variety of natural and man-made forces” (d’souza, 2002:46). In the case of 
the African continent, the macro-factor that causes Africans turn to ASM is primarily poverty in its various 
forms. In many parts of Africa subsistence farmers supplement their meager income by seasonally mining: at 
times of economic recession. Obviously, war causes poverty. Evidently, the over 25 armed conflicts since 1963 
in Africa which affected more than 60% of the population, ASM become the last resort for many people. This 
was common in Sudan, DRC, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.  
Natural disasters and environmental shocks like the volcanic activity in the DRC and in Cameroon, 
floods and cyclones that devastated Mozambique, severe draughts affected Eastern and Western Africa countries 
also force people to ASM. Therefore, ASM is an operation often in subsistence basis that struggle to survive 
from day to day focusing on immediate concerns rather than long-term consequences (d’ souza 2002; CBNRM 
NET, 2003:2, 6; MMSD Global Report, 2002:15; Avila, 2003:19).     
ASM places sustainable livelihoods at stake only providing emergency poverty relief and daily 
subsistence (Hoadley and Limpitlaw, 2004:1-3). ILO estimation 1998 argued that given the mutually reinforcing 
nature of poverty and ASM and the spurring poverty in sub-Saharan Africa ASM dependants have increased 
significantly, and will have been continued to do so. Worse still, ASM remains with only to have value as a 
disaster-coping mechanism in the midst of spurring global poverty, recurrent natural disasters due to global 
warming and higher stockpiles of unemployment and reduced opportunities for traditional livelihood activities 
effected by civil wars and internal strife finally incubating huge number of miners.  
M. Hoadley and D. Limpitlaw (2004:3) contend that in developing countries ASM appeared to be the 
most pertinent economic response to poverty and crisis, there are often few, and at times no alternative to ASM 
and many people are forced into ASM because of poverty and dim employment opportunities.  
ASM sustains negative circles of trapping poverty where both the sector and the government are 
caught in negative cycles and circles of cause and effect. Kevin pcj d’souza (2002:47) explains that a poverty 
trap results from a denial of choices and opportunities whilst living in a marginal and vulnerable environment. 
the genesis of gold mining in Burkina Faso as intimately linked to drought periods in the 1980s taking as a “last 
resort in regions where the soil could no longer be cultivated and many cattle had died,” (Werthmann, 2006: 
123). 
ASM is a Way of Life- Artisanal and small-scale mining is more than simply an industry with the potential to 
contribute positively to foreign exchange earnings and employment, it is a way of life. For instance the ILO has 
conservatively estimated that “between 11 and 13 million in habitants of the developing world, including 
downstream industry employees, dependent families and associated servicemen, depend upon its existence for 
their livelihoods.” (CBNRM NET, 2003:2). As to the actors involved in production, according to this 
community- based natural resource management network (CBNRM NET), ASM operators include seasonal 
subsistence farmers, rural community dwellers, retrenched large scale mine workers and nomadic peoples.  
With regard to Africa, despite its inaccurate estimates due to many of the miners work causally, 
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seasonally or informally, across the continent between 3.2 and 4 million people are directly involved in ASM. 
ASM in Africa also affects the livelihoods of a further 16 to 28 million. The worrying fact is that experts claim 
that the number of people seeking to work in this sector in many parts of Africa (d’souza, 2002:45) is expected 
to triple over the next 10 years.  
Shoko (2003: 1-4) similarly contends that in the Zambezi basin of the SADC region, the estimation 
that people have directly or indirectly benefited small-scale and alluvial panning of minerals reach up to 2 
million. Accordingly, the labor intensive nature of this sector provides income and employment to large number 
of people who are in broader term “uneducated, poor and live in remote areas where no opportunities exist for 
formal employment”. In the southern Africa region alone, ASM sector employ up to 10 million people directly 
and in the SADC countries too, mining is the single alternative for agriculture and its employment figures spurs 
during the recurrent drought. In this region, women and children constitute more than 50% of the employed 
forces. Similarly, up to 15 million people in China are estimated to be involved in this sector.  
ASGM (gold mining) involves still underestimated, 10-15 million miners of which women and 
children constitute 4.5 and 1 million in respective manner. As a way of life hence in over 55 countries at least 
100 million people depend on ASGM for its income and is also believed that this sector produces 20-30% of the 
world’s gold- 500-800 tonnes of gold per year (Module 3, n.d.a:2-4). In South Africa more than 30,000 miners 
are involved in ASM. Furthermore, across countries, women proportion varies from 50-75% (Hoadley and 
Limpitlaw 2004:1). 
ASM is often informal, illegal and open-access- in many countries ASM remained, and continued to be, informal 
sector. This is mainly because either the government does not recognize the ASM sector or lacks means to 
control the compliance to laws and regulations or both1.  
The lack of political will to formalize or legalize the ASM sector can be stimulated by possibility for 
corruption and money laundering and related illegal practices in the womb of personal interests (Global Report 
on ASM 2002).  
Mikael Ross (2003b) argues that illegal substances such as “blood diamonds” command high price in 
the global market since they are illegal and hence groups with such criminal networks benefit more from such 
trades. The “lootability” and “non-obstructability” nature of such “diffuse resources” poses problematic since 
their exploitation is hard to control by the central government. Accordingly, alluvial diamond production in DRC 
and Sierra Leone is more suitable for looting and smuggling out (Basedau, 2005:25).  
Another dimension of ASM is its open-access, non-property regime, nature where communities see no 
justification for involvement in the management and control of the activities as there are no direct benefit 
streams from the sector (Shoko, 2003:3).  ASM despite too illegal, for instance, in Mozambique (95%), Niger 
(95%), Brazil (90%), and 80% in China, Guinea, Philippines , India, and 70% in Colombia, it overwhelmingly 
contributes to the recognized gold production, like in Colombia contributing about 90% (Avila, 2003:17-18). In 
Ghana too, 80% of diamond comes from ASM (MMSD Global Report on ASM 2002:12). 
ASM is Human Right/Security Insensitive- the human rights and security hardly flourish in such an informal, 
illegal and primitive artisanal sector.  
As to child labor, the MMSD Global Report on ASM (2002:23-25) summarizes the child labor issue: 
causes, effects and trends.  
Children start washing gold from 3 years on; from 6 years on they can be seen breaking rocks 
with hammers or washing ore. Children as young as 9 can be observed underground, and at 
12 boys are widespread working underground in many countries and do the same work than 
adults. In the Cerro Rico in Potosi, Bolivia half of the total amounts of 8000 miners are 
children and adolescents.  
That report list causes for child labor poverty being grand of which: specifically low family income, lack 
educational infrastructure, lack of parents’ interest to educate their children, lack of parents awareness for the 
risk of children in mining, lack of orientation concerning their children’ future, lack of legislative, enforcement 
and labor inspection, and culture. These adversely affect the children: drop-out of school, physical or 
psychological development problems, health problems due to mercury pollution or heavy loads and incalculable 
accidents. 
Regardless ratification of the ILO convention on the rights of the child by most African states, due to 
abject poverty, AIDS orphanage and lack of monitory means, there exist considerable gaps for children 
exploitation. Due to lack of efforts to stop it, to improve the sector, to provide regular employment or incentive 
to go to school and enforce laws, these children are not only exposed to immediate risk but they are also 
jeopardizing their long term development both physically and mentally (d’ souza, 2002:51). 
                                                 
1 Local traditional and cultural behavior; lack of knowledge of the legal requirement; little incentives of the government to 
operate legally; high tax burden; limited access to mining title; demanding bureaucratic procedures to gain and remain 
formal; limited danger of sanctions in combination with the possibilities to evade the imposition of the law by corruption 
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From gender perspective, 45-50% of all ASM workers in Africa are women (varying from 5% (Gabon 
and RSA), 35 (Guinea), 45% (Ghana and Burkina), 50% (Mali) and 75% (Zimbabwe). This wide range of 
women involvement in ASM in Africa is associated with family based responsibilities. In Africa despite 
women’s better management of these sectors, they are more constrained to get financial, legal and technical 
support (d’souza, 2002:50).  
The participation of women in ASM is not confined to only mining but also a range of activities 
including food, drink and tools supply, gold trade and sexual services. Due to combinations of lack of collaterals 
for loan and negative attitudes towards them, a UNIFEM study found that only 6% of women miners had been 
able to obtain a loan to invest in their mining operations (Ibid: 22).          
Further, obstacles and constraints related to gender issues in this sector in African countries include the 
fact that women are faced by host of traditional challenges, against asserting their rights, like illiteracy, 
insufficient technical knowledge, chauvinist attitudes, patriarchal views, social taboos and family responsibilities. 
Women are not part of the decision making process, are deprived of their property ownership, even from their 
mining lands by companies or by officials denying them mining licenses. Women are engaged in illicit mining 
for subsistence far away from equity (CSO, n.d.a:10).  
Women involvement in ASM is generally high as compared to large scale mining. For instance in 
Guinea, women comprise 75% of ASM followed by 50% in Madagascar, Mali and Zimbabwe and 40% in 
Bolivia and in the Gaova region of Burkina Faso the exploitation and selling of gold has traditionally been a 
female-only activity (MMSD Global Report on ASM, 2002:21). Importantly, mainstreaming gender issues to 
mining polices help alleviate poverty since they often spend their income on family needs as contrary to male 
counterparts who tend to be rather frivolous and irresponsible (d’souza: 50-51; Global Report on ASM, 2002:21-
22)  
Regarding Human Right violations (of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights), United 
Nations Human Right Team Group Discussion paper on mining and Human Right in Mongolia (2006:1-15) has 
reviewed human right/security threats for herders: a) their right to subsistence (farming and animal husbandry) 
has been violated for pastureland and surface water resource have been destroyed. For instance, since gold 
mining require large amount of surface and ground  water and often use it inefficiently, “according to 
Mongolia’s 2003 water census report, more than 3000 rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, springs and mineral water 
sources have completely dried up”; (b) when local economic opportunities are destroyed, they will be denied of 
the right to sustain and improve their lives; (c) polluted, contaminated, destructed and depleted (unsafe and 
unhealthy) environment has violated the right to live in safety (d) denial the right to participate in decision-
making regarding their lands minerals; (f) as the herder have to forcefully move out of their lands, their rights to 
education, health care and social welfare services are denied; (g) they have been denied the right to participate in 
monitoring and rehabilitation of their damaged lands and resources, and (h) the forced abandonment of their 
traditional life style due to mining on their lands denied their right to preserve their culture and way of life.  
The absence of providing Artisanal miners information on how to protect their rights (as the sector 
might be so peripheralized) perpetuate the all sorts human rights and security violations primarily the right to (a) 
life, live in a healthy and safe environment, food and adequate nutrition, health care, education, vote and 
participate in civic affairs, etc (Ibid:9)  
ASM is Conflict Inherent- Moira Feil and Jason Switzer (2004: 3) on their work Valuable minerals and conflict 
address the tinderbox nature of mining in the sense that conflict can arise over land claims and access to 
resources with the entry of any type mining. Communities may be relocated so that companies can reach the 
valuable minerals beneath the soil. The dispute can intensify when locals are offered insufficient compensation, 
excluded from decision-making processes, and find their livelihoods threatened. 
The heart of conflict here lies on the dynamics created by sudden gold digging fortune seekers that 
influx onto the communities’ land illegally. Massive influx of gold diggers threaten the environmental and 
economic resources of local agricultural communities complicated by the belief that land and gold are considered 
natural as well as supernatural resources (Werthmann 2006:120). The question of land and gold belonging 
generates competition between these stakeholders. L. Obara and H. Jenkins (2006: 6) appeared to argue that 
another bone of contention raised by local communities and NGOs point to ASM and companies as lacking 
compatible, clear and legitimate right of access to resources. As are commonly reported conflicts between 
artisanal miners and police, companies, license holders, local citizens and local authorities are pervasive (UNHR 
Team Group, 2006:9-10). The local population seems to have at least three options that is toleration, negotiation 
or expulsion (Werthmann, 2006:132).  
Another conflict dimension in this sector is among ASM miners themselves and against large-scale 
mining companies, between the license holders and illegal ASM: constant competition over plots of land 
overlying rich mineral deposits,  ASM miners commonly encroach onto the land concessions awarded to large 
scale mining companies by miners yet relying it for subsistence,  reopening of suspended operations, prospects 
of new sites and reluctance to giveaway, and relocate from, their ancestral lands, absence of alternative source of 
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livelihood, ASM miners are considered as an unpaid ‘geologists’ that after they effectively find the gold 
potential for companies, they are expulsed as illegal intruders or trespassers, they mutually mistrust and resent 
for ASM consider companies as depriving of their lands and livelihood (Hilson, 2001:18-20; Obara and Jenkins, 
2006:5-7; d’souza, 2002:53, 2009; Feil and Switzer 2004). 
In similar treatment, ASM is conflict inherent, particularly when it takes the form of ‘gold rush’ (or 
sudden rush) - when large size of new miners arrive, it is frequently observed to come into conflict with the local 
people. It too attracts local residents to leave their farms and after the rush is over they see few lasting benefits.  
Further, conflict causation between ASM and large scale-mining companies is that the former have 
often congregated around the later taking advantage of their best access and perhaps re-mining their waste 
(d’souza, 2002-53). ASM is conflict-ridden because of its informal and illegal nature that sustains illiciting 
compounded by low or no control; it perpetuates rebel activities like in DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone (Ibid). 
This might flame and entrench war economy and rent-seeking. Finally, in areas where ASM developed to 
associations and cooperatives have proven conflictual failing to define shared objectives and long-term vision as 
members prioritize their interest (Avila, 2003:24-25).                     
ASM is Antithetical to Environmental Security- A combination of lack of awareness, lack of information about 
affordable methods to reduce impacts and lack of incentives to change contributes to environmental tragedy. 
Among the plethora of ASM related environmental impacts include : land degradation and soil erosion damage, 
landscape destruction, mercury pollution, cyanide pollution, direct dumping of tailing and effluents into river, 
threats from improperly constructed dams, river damage in alluvial areas, river siltation, and acid mined drainage 
(AMD) ( d’souza, 2002:52-3, 2009; Feil and Switzer 2004).  
D’souza (P.53) argues two critical challenges escalate the environmental tragedy: (a) subsistence 
(short-term survival strategy) nature of the ASM operation and (b) (African) governments “no” commitment or 
lack the capacity to control and monitor the operation- which is too remote and inaccessible.  
In short, due to the informality of the sector, seasonal operations, lack of official statistics and 
definitional problems, the actual number of people employed in this sector is conservatively underestimated and 
is inaccurate. Yet it is crystal clear that ASM is undertaken extensively worldwide (Africa, Asia, Oceania, and 
central and South America) particularly in developing countries. The MMSD country research studies has 
identified Ethiopia among the 45 relevant ASM countries list1  
 
2. The Ethiopian “Rain-fed Mining” Sector Context in Transformation Impasse  
This section briefly summarizes the problems plaguing the mineral sector, its nature and characteristics, its 
causal underpinnings, potential effects, the emergent scenarios therein and the ways forwarded that streamlines 
the points for intervention. 
Currently, the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector in western Tigray, Ethiopia, is 
of a clarion call issue which pours salt to the wounds of historically torn ecology. It matters both a mining 
affected communities’, and beyond, socio-economic, environmental and security dynamics. In positive direction, 
the mining sector can be a conduit to address a plethora of development and security concerns. In the negative 
direction of ASGM, it sustains grinding poverty, conflict, capital flight, corruption and marginalization.  
Two interrelated issues are here worthwhile. Firstly, the primitive nature of the sector prepares a 
ground for conflict and security risks.  Secondly, the emergent transformational efforts (in dilemma) are 
primarily an old wine in new bottle that are short of addressing and capturing the underpinning roots of the 
problem. As to the first specter in its nature: artisanal mining is poverty-driven-and-feeding, miners vary from 
(semi)permanent, seasonal, home-based/or jungle-based, emergent “rush gangs”, a luring sector that seldom 
materializes promises, complex groups (- poverty trapped prisoners of hope) and so on.  
And as to the physical and spatial characteristics of the mineral and mining areas in insecurity 
causation, in strict sense, there exists no water-tight distinction between “point” and “diffuse” minerals.  Both are 
water dependent. Yet “point” or concentrate mineral resources trigger intense conflict than “diffuse”/disperse 
ones in situation of greed-and-grievance. Put differently, “diffuse” mineral resources are relatively peaceful but 
uncontrollable than “point” minerals. Yet in “rain-fed/barto” gold mining, “diffuse” resources by and large 
escalate conflict, damage environment, widen conflict areas, etc. “Point” minerals are mined due, mainly, to: 
exhaustion of alluvial or “barto”(rain-fed) gold, dry seasons, motive for good and quick rewards, temporary 
(until exhaustion) control, inaccessibility to “barto” areas by local forces and so forth.  
                                                 
1 CAR, Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, Uganda in Africa, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam in Asia, and Chile, Colombia, Dominica Republic, French Guyana, Guyana, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Surinam and Venezuela in Latin America and the Caribbean(MMSD Global Report on ASM, 2002:10-11). 
Furthermore, this report revealed Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, China, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru as most important 
ASM countries.     
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN (Paper)2224-5766 ISSN (Online)2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.1, 2016 
 
26 
 “Lottery” gold mineral can be both “point” as well as “barto”. “Point lottery” gold mining is much 
conflict-stricken among mining actors than “rain-fed diffuse lottery” but the opposite is true for soil degradation 
and conflict with local people. “Diffuse” minerals can be alluvial or “barto”. “Diffuse” minerals can also be 
scattered “point” minerals. “Point” minerals demand physical strength, patience and “jiwa” (group) formations. 
Environmental damage and influx of miners is by far larger in “rain-fed diffuse” minerals. Home-based miners 
are entirely occupied in “rain-fed-diffuse” gold mining. “Rain-fed diffuse” gold sector becomes highly lootable 
in the rainy season than the “point” mineral in the dry season. The converse is also true in the dry season. The 
spatial and physical characteristics make it so lootable. 
In the second concluding point, exacerbating challenges complicated the mineral sector: the 
government begun to legalize; miners do not want to be legal due to their mobility; government allow farmers to 
defend their lands, farmers have no capacity to defend the mass influx of miners nor the government have 
capacity/commitment as well as space to control them. Dilemma is ripe. Except kushet Maichew, the rest local 
communities lack cooperation to defend against invaders which in any case does not work out the underlying 
problem.  
Such challenges are grouped into: production-side and governance-side. Production-side challenges or 
risks include that mineral production process is uneconomic, inefficient, and unviable; no environmental 
considerations, no rehabilitation and sustainability efforts and duties; production process depletes and degrades 
the local natural resources (the life sustaining capital) of the poor sedentary farmers; mineral production process 
is carried out in the midst of human and physical environment that are both conducive and exposed to 
multidimensional threat and vulnerability risks; the production process, objects and environment spark conflict 
and lit security risks at three levels, i.e. resource area and mineral control, exploitation process and benefit- 
sharing and long-term risks.  
Another emergent issue is governance-side and transparency problems. The ASGM sector continued to 
be an “island of wealth” in the absence of legal and policy mechanisms for about two decades. Since the sector 
has been out of administrative machinery with “zero” cost of entry, poor people in the sector has been victim to 
predatory smugglers and the affected people has lost and continued to lose its goose that lays the golden egg- 
multi-pronged marginalization and impoverishment risks upon the agricultural base of livelihood.  
Artisanal gold miners too continued to behave and act in Wildman fashions that survive in the rule of 
nature across jungle areas. Worst still, the gold miners are unmanageable -neither capable nor agreeable for 
transformation. Moreover, the formalization processes are complicated due to manipulations and misguidance at 
cooperativisation levels. This is mainly because the sector is a manifestation of necessity rather than cause of 
opportunity. The scenario found to be that grinding poverty pushing out needy and greedy actors to the “Island 
of wealth” posing marginalization risks as an opportunity cost on the local people.  
The sector feeds the gold producers in the jungle from hand-to-mouth while well enough for the 
predatory smugglers and perhaps for the new “legal” associations. This is because the old smugglers continue to 
monopolize the legal Unions whereas the local Customs Authority “expropriating” their long lasting mainstay of 
livelihood labeling them “illegal” and “lords of black marketing”. The 100% artisanal mode of gold extraction, 
growing sack by market and local livelihood, not-legalized, open-access, “distant”, uncontrollable status made 
the sector extremely lootable and a tinderbox of insecurity. 
The paradox of transparency and formalization process of the mineral sector lies for instance in the 
way “Cooperative Unions” are organized and vested with rights and duties. Firstly, some gold cooperatives 
unions have dual task rights: producing as well as transaction (buy and sale). Since producers and buyers at 
cooperatives level are not transparent, their sale and legal exportation is equally dim. Secondly, since gold is 
solely produced by the excluded laboring individual- based nomadic miners, the source and basis of gold market 
in the Cooperative- Individual miners’ encounter is not transparent. Thirdly, since the gold production process is 
precarious, backbreaking, and exploited by the market, all Production Unions have preferred not starting. Hence, 
the new legal market in place is rather better to coin “a black eye-glassed market” which “systematizes (potential) 
exclusion and rentierism”. It in turn makes greed-and-grievance and crime ripe and perhaps “institutional”. In 
other words, the transformational interventions miss the points of concern. 
Does a mere abundance of valuable mineral resources in the midst of abject poverty inevitably ignite 
insecurity and risk on local livelihood? In my finding, the concrete issue that ties the bone of contention is not 
essentially the valuable mineral but the process of making it – unintended side- effects. This manifests at three 
stages: as an engagement, as a process of production and as a spillover effect.  A secondary conflict issue is, 
however, the valuable mineral- strengthened by market and dwindling source of livelihood. This is the overlap 
of scarcity and abundance. Poverty and market trapped increasingly joining actors in the sector. Nature and 
context, seasonality, causality, difficulty and perpherality of the ASGM sector are the most salient reasons for its 
informality and not- legalized status.  
With the current trends, expansion possibility of the sector including into large-scale mining is strong. 
Despite the status quo formal interventions, the resource “curse” conflict and impoverishment risks will unfold: 
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child labor, school drop-outs, alcoholism and STDs hazards are rampant. The vulnerable nature of the sector 
entails socio-economic and political detriments: extravagant unskilled labor force with crowding-out effect and 
the sector is isolated serving only short-term consumption and debt repayment ends. Two concurrent issues are 
missed: the mineral wealth is abused and simultaneously affected peoples’ rights are violated with alarming 
negative synergies on (human) security.  
In comparison to other same works, similar to earlier findings (Auty 2001), (Lujala 2003) (Le Billon 
2001, 2002, and 2005), Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) and (Ross 2003), the sector is quite lootable. Further, as D’ 
souza (2002, 2009), Chupezi, et al (2009), MMSD Global Report on ASM (2002) and World Bank/CASM 
Report (2005) point out the sector is conflict prone, itinerant, necessity pushed, mediated by exclusion, legal 
fault lines and ever-expanding mineral market demand and a recipe for lasting insecurity mainly at production 
areas. The “resource curse thesis” (Auty 1993) and context matters (Basedau 2005) at macro-level are partially 
existent, since ASM is a halfway to large-scale mining, with strong probability- GCU and Ezana plc as 
illustrative stepping actors. A, little bit similar, finding on Mining Cooperatives inharmonic and frenzy nature 
(Avila 2003) is that they are incapable, inefficient, uninterested and exclusive in production, misleading in 
establishment, boundlessly oligopolistic and misguided.   
My findings yet dispute the World Bank/CASM Report (2005) claim that limits artisanal miners’ daily 
income only to about $1 which I found to be about $1 for the home-based miners and about $7 for the jungle-
based ones. However, the difference could be due to absence of large-scale mining which could have 
monopolized the rewarding reserves and the facts that market price differ on valuable mineral, time and country 
specificity.  
The lootable minerals-insecurity nexus is thus well proof in the context of artisanal mode of mining in 
dominance, growing contribution, as hand-to-mouth “alternative”, to sources of livelihood and reluctance of the 
by the state. 
Lastly, the sector needs comprehensive policy interventions for which end this project owes to propose 
a transformative ways. In broader setting, the stakeholders need to mainstream six priorities to address: conflict, 
poverty, marginalization, vulnerability, stereotyping, and “nomadism” of the artisanal gold mining.  
In the fore, it is a clarion call to facilitate ASGM sector transformation from a transitory shock coping 
responsive activity into a serious business venture and to change affected and mining communities from 
vulnerable and marginal enclaves of individual-based not-legalized nomadic miners into integrated, sustainable 
and resilient ones.  
Secondly, ASGM should be people-centered rather than only profit-motivated or employment 
opportunity and collaborations among multi-stakeholders are of critical value.  
Thirdly, revenue and benefit-streaming to affected communities/people and infrastructural provision to 
both miners and mining affected areas are needed.  
Fourthly, gathering relevant data (sector profile) about poverty impacts, risks, hazards and 
opportunities of the ASGM sector; identifying (and mapping) champions/spoilers at all levels, priorities and 
mechanisms for intervention; set clear and feasible objectives in constructive, consultative and participant 
approach in the sector.  
Fifthly, promote the sustainable livelihoods of mining affected as well as nomadic gold miners towards 
diversifying the local economic activities; enhancing the ASGM capacity to holdback the rural-urban migrants 
by fostering local economic multipliers.  
Sixthly, adopt pluralist, holistic and multi-pronged approach to eliminate or reduce its isolation and 
sub-optimal resource exploitation due to primitiveness, risky, hazardous and criminalized nature of the sector.  
Seventhly, the transformation process should go beyond mere legalization and formalization: need to 
broaden source of income in off-mining sectors in a sisterly mode.  
Eighthly, the necessity to shift mentality and mechanisms towards resource management (besides 
extraction) is crucial. The reality of “island of prosperity in the sea of poverty” is a recipe for “resource curse”. 
Hence good governance plays pivotal role in controlling, monitoring, managing, promoting and transforming the 
artisanal mineral sector becoming a blessing.   
Ninthly, promoting STDs awareness creation in mining areas, adopting CSBP and establishing early 
warning system and proactive mechanisms across mining affected communities is of a timely request. 
Tenthly, two well renowned frameworks are relevant in searching for remedy of the ASGM sector. 
One is the Yaoundé Vision (2002) (in Pedro 2004) which underlines the mainstreaming of the artisanal mining 
in poverty reduction strategic papers (PRSPs) of African governments for which their laws and policies in the 
sector need to be reviewed accordingly. The second framework is CASM’s Vision on ASM provides, in its 
strategic plan (2004-06) (in Pedro 2004), essential ways: advance integrated rural and regional development, 
effective and equitable legal framework, local infrastructure and services, fair markets and credits, complying 
with international standards on child labor and occupational safety, use environmental friendly techniques (for 
extraction) and establish positive and productive relations with all stakeholders including local communities, 
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artisanal miners, GCU and (the emerging) “large-scale gold mining”. 
A final “all” encompassing recommendation by Jon Hobbs, CASM chairman (World Bank/CASM 
2005) in seeking to achieve a productive, profitable and self- sustaining, artisanal mining sector, I assume a 
conduit to transform the sector in study, envisions 5Rs: Reinvestment of income to improve performance; 
Rights protection; Responsibilities, both social and environmental, that complement those rights; Revenue 
generation within the sector; Regulatory measures to ensure formal ASM structures. For this purpose, the 
sector needs to be formalized with a FPIC laying CSBP on the heart of legal mining. 
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